The MMER project

Moral Motivation: Evidence and Relevance

Published works by the participants of MMER relevant to the topic of the project:


  1. Björnsson, G. (with Tristram McPherson) (forthcoming) ”Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the specification problem”,  Mind

  2. Strandberg, C., Björklund, F. (Forthcoming), “Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?”, Philosophical Psychology.


  1. Björnsson, G., Francén Olinder, R. ”Internalists Beware – we Might all be Amoralists”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1): 1-14

  2. Strandberg, C. “An Internalist Dilemma—And an Externalist Solution”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10, 25–51


  1. Björklund, F, Björnsson, G, Eriksson, J, Francén Olinder, R, Strandberg, C,  ”Recent Work: Motivational Internalism”, Analysis, 72, 124-137.

  2. Björnsson, G. (2012) ”Do ‘objectivist’ features of moral discourse and thinking support moral objectivism?” Journal of Ethics. 16:4 pp. 367-93.

  3. Francén Olinder R. ”Svavarsdottirs Burden”, Philosophia, 40, 577-589.

  4. Francén Olinder R. ”Moral and Metaethical Pluralism: Unity in Variation”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50, 583–601

  5. Strandberg, C. “A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84, pp. 87–122.

  6. Strandberg, C. “Expressivism and Dispositional Desires”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 49, pp. 81–91.


  1. Eriksson, J. (2011) ”Straight Talk: Conceptions of Sincerity in Speech”, Philosophical Studies, 153, 213-234.

  2. Strandberg, C. (2011) “The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation”. The Journal of Ethics, 15 (4), 341–369.


  1. Björklund, F. (with Agerström, J. & Allwood, C. M.) (2010). The influence of temporal distance on justice and care morality. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 51, 46-55.

  2. Björnsson, G. (with Stephen Finlay) (2010) ”Metaethical contextualism defended”, Ethics 121:1 pp. 7-36.

  3. Björnsson, G. (with Almér, A) (2010) ”The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments” In Partee, B.H., Glanzberg, M., & Skilters, J. Formal semantics and pragmatics. Discourse, context and models. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, Vol. 6. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press, pp. 1–45.

  4. Francén, R. (2010) ”No deep disagreement for new relativists”, Philosophical Studies, 151, 19-37. (DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9414-6)

  5. Francén, R. (2010) “Moral motivation pluralism”, Journal of Ethics, 14, 117-148. (DOI: 10.1007/s10892-010-9074-y)


  1. Björklund, F. (with Agerström, J). (2009). Moral concerns are greater for temporally distant events and are moderated by value strength. Social Cognition, 27, 260-281.

  2. Björklund, F. (with Agerström, J.) (2009). Temporal distance and moral concerns: Future immoral behavior is perceived as more wrong and evokes stronger prosocial intentions. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 31, 1-11.

  3. Björnsson, G (with Alexander Almér). (2009) "Contextualism, assessor relativism, and insensitive assessments" Logique et Analyse 52:208, pp. 363-372;

  4. Eriksson, J. (2009) ”Homage to Hare:  Ecumenism and the Frege-Geach Problem”, Ethics, 120, 8-35.

  5. Eriksson, J. (2009) ”The Out of Joint Argument for Internalism”, in Variations on a Theme  in Logic, Ethics and all that Jazz: Essays in Honor of Jordan Howard Sobel (eds). L. G. Johansson, J. Österberg and R. Sliwinski.

  6. Francén, R. (2009) ”Att kunna skilja mellan rätt och fel”, i Tillräknelighet, ed. Susanna Radovic och Henrik Anckarsäter, Studentlitteratur,.


  1. Björklund, F. (with Agerström, J. & Allwood, C. M.) (2008). The effects of time and abstraction on moral concerns. Lund Psychological Reports, 9, 1-37.

  2. Björklund, F. (with Haidt, J.) (2008). Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology (Vol 2). The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity (pp. 181-217). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

  3. Björklund, F. (with Haidt, J.) (2008). Social intuitionists reason, in conversation. W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology (Vol 2). The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity (pp. 241-254). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.


  1. Francén, R. (2007) Metaethical Relativim: Against the Single Analysis Assumption, Department of Philosophy, University of Gothenburg. (Doctoral dissertation)

  2. Strandberg, C. (2007) “Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation”, Philosophia, 35 (2), 249–260.


  1. Björnsson, G. (2005) "Christine Korsgaards moralfilosofi" Filosofisk Tidskrift 1, pp. 38-54 (“The Moral Philosophy of Christine Korsgaard”, in Swedish)


  1. Björklund, F. (2004). Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings. In W. Rabinowicz & T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (Eds.), Patterns of value: Essays on formal axiology and value analysis (Vol. 2, pp. 36-50). Lund Philosophy Reports, 2004:1.

  2. Strandberg, C. (2004) Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism, Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University.


  1. Björklund, F. (2003). Differences in the justification of choices in moral dilemmas: Effects of gender, time pressure and dilemma seriousness. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 44, 459-466.

  2. Björnsson, G. (2003) "How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression", Southern Journal of Philosophy 40:3, pp. 327-44


  1. Björnsson, (2001) G. "Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency", Philosophical Studies 104, pp. 81-108


  1. Björnsson, G. (2000) "En Internalistisk Teori om Moraliska Uppfattningar", Filosofisk tidskrift 1, pp. 3-21 (“An Internalist Theory of Moral Opinions”, in Swedish)

  2. Strandberg, C. (2000) “Aristotle’s Internalism in the Nicomachean Ethics”, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 34 (1), 71–87.


  1. Strandberg, C. (1999) “Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation”, Theoria, LXV (2), 171–192.


  1. Björnsson, G. (1998) Moral Internalism. An Essay in Moral Psychology,  Stockholm: Stockholm University (Doctoral thesis, monograph.)



May 18-20 2012. Conference: Moral Motivation: Evidence and Relevance


Invited speakers:

  1. James Dreier (Brown) Jeanette Kennett (Macquarie)

  2. Jesse Prinz (CUNY)

  3. Michael Ridge (Edinburgh)Michael Smith (Princeton)Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Ohio) Jon Tresan (Chapel Hill)

  4. Nick Zangwill (Durham)

Continuous activities. The MMER research seminar meets about ten times each semester.

August 17-18 2011.
Workshop on The Relevance of Motivational Internalism

Invited speakers:
    Jon Tresan (Chapel Hill)
Michael Ridge (Edinburgh)
    Jimmy Lenman (Sheffield)  
    Nick Zangwill (Durham)

September 4th 2010. Workshop on Metaethics and Empirical Methods.

Presentations by:
    Shaun Nichols (Arizona)
    Antti Kauppinen (Dublin)
    Folke Tersman (Uppsala)
    Gunnar Björnsson
    (Linköping, Gothenburg)
    Ragnar Francén